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Georgia and the Caucasus 
Search for the Principles for the Regional Security Concept 
 
The question of foreign orientation has always been a subject of acute discussions in 
Georgia. Being a part of the national self-identification problem, it concerns almost all 
strata of the Georgian community. What country is to be a guarantor of Georgia’s security–
Russia or the West? Does the way to the West lays on Turkey? Is the Caucasian co-
operation capable to guarantee the national security? These are the questions the Georgians 
and their foreign partners are concerned for.  
Russia, Turkey and Iran have always been interested in the Caucasus and affected its 
stability. In its turn, each Caucasian nation used to apply to any of these countries in search 
of security and an ally. For instance, Azerbaijan preferred Turkey; Armenia chose Iran and 
Russia, the North Caucasus – Turkey and Iran, whereas Georgia applied to Russia. It was a 
historically developed security system of the Caucasus, though with some faults: tensions 
between the big regional countries sparked discords between their Caucasian allies, and vice 
versa, disagreements between the Caucasian countries provoked tensions between the 
regional countries. After the break up of the Soviet Union, the Caucasians reverted to their 
traditional allies. This is proved by pro-Turkey period in Azerbaijan, the Armenia-Russia 
military co-operation, developing connections between the North Caucasian nations and 
South Islamic countries, and Georgia’s reverse to Russia after the collapse in Abkhazia.  
The concept of unity of the Caucasian nations has always been existed as an alternative 
to the above-depicted security system, however, it has never been brought into being. 
Nowadays, Caucasian co-operation in search of regional and national security is uppermost 
again, though some principles of such co-operation have to be specified. For instance, the 
fact that at the present time the North Caucasus straightly affects Georgia's stability makes 
Georgia conduct a direct dialogue with the North Caucasians. From the other hand, the 
North Caucasus is a part of the Russian Federation - that makes it complicated problem to 
deal with. Or let us take the issue of simultaneous development of relations of the Caucasian 
countries with the West and any of the regional countries (Russia, for instance), that many 
foreign and local experts regard as contradictory.  
The present article analyses formation of political orientations in the Caucasus, features 
attempts to shape the Caucasian regional and national security systems, stresses the great 
importance of co-operation between the Caucasian nations and the role of Russia, Turkey 
and Iran in the regional security system, and suggests principles of relations between the 
Caucasus and non-regional (the western) countries.  
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Historical Review  
Events that brought the Caucasus to the present day political situations are accepted to 
regard since the 18th century. At that time Iran and Turkey constantly struggled for the 
sphere of influence in the South Caucasus (Georgia was a bone of contention between Iran 
and Ottoman Empire), while Russia, gradually strengthening its positions advanced in the 
direction of the North Caucasus. This circumstance brought into question the problem of 
security for the North Caucasian nations that had got rather uncertain place on the political 
picture of the region for that time.  
Strengthening of Islam in this period among North Caucasians seems to be strongly 
motivated by political reasons – the North Caucasians endeavoured to distinguish 
themselves from Russia ideologically and reinforce relations with the South Islamic 
countries. (It was like the Georgians that admitted Christianity as the state religion in AD 
333 to wrest the country from Zoroastrian Iran’s influence and strengthen links with 
Bizantium.)  
Later, urged by their Southern (Muslim) allies, the North Caucasians began to invade 
Georgia kidnapping and selling the Georgians on the markets of Turkey and Iran. In a 
subsequent difficult situation, when Georgia was seized not only by Iran and Osman-Turks 
from the South, but by North Caucasians from North as well, the Georgian kings had to 
seek allies farther in the North - in Russia calculating to balance this double pressure. It is 
important to comprehend that the Georgian kings (King George XI for example) also 
contacted certain European monarchs, hoping to find allies, but vainly. Finally, Georgia 
accepted the protection of Russia, which created a kind of balance between Christian and 
Muslim forces in the Caucasus, making the Caucasus not a mere junction of the Islamic 
South and Christian North geopolitical areas, but a kind of transversal zone comprising the 
Christian South and the Muslim North (see pic.1)  
Armenia and Azerbaijan also served for a point of intersection to Iran and Turkey. 
Armenia is situated straight between Turkey and Azerbaijan, ethnically related to Turkey. 
The small isthmus, which joins Armenia to Iran, separates Azerbaijan from Turkey (see pic. 
2). It is most amazing, how Armenia could survive in such a complicated political situation. 
But Iran, trying to safeguard its northern boundaries supported security of Armenia in order 
to protect it from being incorporated by the Turks. Besides, Iran used to be invaded by the 
Turkmens from the Northeast. These circumstances made Iran to guarantee Armenia's 
security. (More, than that Armenia’s Monophisitism is a testimony to its traditional alliance 
with Iran. It was Iran that in the 6th century encouraged Monophisitism in the South 
Caucasus to estrange it from Byzantium).  
Thus, the Caucasus is a complicated political unit, where the interests of three 
geopolitical forces – Russia, Turkey and Iran are realized. Confrontations taking place both 
between the big regional powers and the Caucasus has always had reciprocal affection.  
Meanwhile, collision of interests between Russia and numerous European countries in 
Turkey and Iran brought into question so-called "Eastern Question", mainly concerning the 
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problem of the Ottoman Empire legacy. The European countries and Russia pursued 
contradictory policy in Turkey, trying to wrest the country from the central government's 
control from one hand and urge restoration of territorial unity from another.  
In 1827 the European and Russian fleets defeated the Osman-Turks in the battle for 
independence of Greece. After some years the Egyptians followed the Greek example, 
threatening to invade Istanbul. The sultan Mahmud III appealed to Russia for assistance. 
The Russians began the landing operation at the Bosphorus Peninsula. Alarmed Europeans 
hastily managed the Egypt-Turkey problem and forced the Russian troops out of Turkey. By 
1840 London Convention the Russian protection was replaced by the Common European 
Agreement.  
During the 19th century the Caucasian section of the Russian-Turkey front had been 
reflecting contradictory policy of Russia and the West towards Turkey to a certain extend. 
On one hand, the front lied through the South borders of Georgia, Azerbaijan and the 
present Armenia, on the other hand –the North Caucasus, by the side of the rivers Kuban 
and Terg.  
In 1853-56 years the Shamil-headed North Caucasians at the same time with Turkey and 
Turkey's European allies (Britain and French) framed a front to make Russia abandon the 
Caucasus, but it was not to be, as far as for that time the Russians had gained a strong 
political foundation to their presence in the South-Caucasus. (More than that, this alliance 
had had strong foundation since the beginning of the 19th century, when Russia, being at 
war with Napoleon and Turkey at the same time could wrest the North provinces from Iran 
that was signed at the Goulistan Peace Treaty in 1813.)  
In 1856, Russia's fleet collapsed in the Crimea battle and sustained heavy losses in the 
North Caucasus; it was about to abandon the Caucasus. But the Georgian generals Orbeliani 
and Baratoff played a significant part in changing this decision. These two and general 
Tsitsianoff (Tsitsihvili) headed Russian troops against the North Caucasians targeting at 
unification of Georgia with co-religious Russian Empire in order to protect Georgia from 
Iran and Osman-Turks.  
Obviously, attitude towards the Russian administration greatly differed in Georgia. 
Numerous uprisings, sparked by introduction of the Russian administration, among them is 
the 1832 year conspiracy in Georgia where a lot of representatives of the Georgian 
aristocracy participated, in short, rightness of the Russian orientation - all these events have 
been topics of discussions for the Georgians since that times. Was this measure the only 
way out, when Turkey and Iran were gradually weakening? But there was a great but: 
Georgia's endeavour to unite with Russia was motivated by lack of its autonomous place in 
the "international policy" of that time. Paris Peace Treaty of 1856, concluded after the 
Crimea War that acknowledged unity and independence of the Ottoman Empire included 
Georgia or at least a part of it, sparking a dilemma – either Turkey or Russia. In such a 
difficult situation the Georgians seemed willing to bend for the European life-style rather 
than for the Islamic one. “The way to the West lies through Russia” was the main formula 
of the Georgian foreign policy in the 19th century. Despite some disadvantages of the 
Russian administration, significant changes took place in the country and during the early 
E. Mchedlishvili Search for the Principles for the Regional Security Concept 
 
4 
 
nineteenth century Tbilisi gradually transformed from a medieval town into a modern 
European city. The earlier situation was alike when despite Georgia demonstrated its 
capacity for self-defence from weakened Iran and Turkey, The Georgian King Erekle II had 
to accept protection of Russia (the 1783 year Georgievsk Treaty) though without illusions 
concerning Russia's true targets in the Caucasus.   
The Caucasus definitely differs from Russia, Turkey and Iran. But the World Politics of 
that time didn't reckon with natural interests of the region. The Caucasus was taken as a part 
of any of these three powers. Successively, such approach sparked great turmoil and 
disorientation in the Caucasus. Each nation had to take care of itself. Some of them hoped 
for support of Russia, the others rely on the Ottoman Empire and Iran.  
Admission of the Caucasus as a part of Turkey or Iran accelerated unification of Georgia 
with Christian Russia. None of the political measures would stop this process because of its 
bilateral character – the Georgians also took part in it. Only straight interest of the European 
countries might urge the Caucasus to block expansion of Russia in the direction of the 
South.   
 
The Modern Situation 
After the break up of the Soviet Union there were created three independent states in the 
Caucasus: Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Numerous autonomous republics of Russian 
Federation are also situated in the North Caucasus. All of them are facing many problems 
sparked by steep change of the political climate. In a subsequent difficult situation the 
Caucasian nations are searching for reliable political partners to guarantee their security and 
accelerate integration in the World processes.  
Interests of the regional countries – Russia, Turkey and Iran in the Caucasus are often 
contradictory, however it is possible to spot out some basic tendencies: 
Russia regards the Caucasus, as well as other former Soviet republics, as its “near 
abroad”, that creates so-called “security belt” around the country. Subsequently, Russia's 
attempts to keep up military and economic control in the former Soviet republics as well as 
its unwillingness to let other countries appear in the Caucasus is quite understandable. 
Russia is strongly against co-operation between the former Soviet republics and NATO, 
construction of the Caspian pipeline via the Caucasus, East-West transport corridor, etc. 
Still strong in Armenia, Russia had to withdraw the troops from Azerbaijan and restrict in 
Georgia. Taking into account shaky foundations of the Russian military presence in the 
country, their withdrawal is a matter of time. More than that, despite the North Caucasus is 
a part of the Russian Federation, in 1994-99 years the Russian troops have been turned out 
of Chechnya. As for the Russian feeble economic influence in the Caucasus, it is supposed 
to weaken even more.  
Iran seems to benefit from newly established states of the Caucasus and Central Asia: 
serving for a buffer zone between Russia and Iran they have reduced Iran's traditional 
anxiety about possible Russian aggression against Iran; besides, Iran got new possibilities to 
reach China through Central Asia and Europe – through the Caucasus, though it failed to 
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influence the above-mentioned states ideologically. Yet possible expansion of Turkey and 
the western countries causes Iran’s great anxiety as far as it may be hazardous not only for 
its economic position in these regions, but also for its inner stability urging separatists in 
Azeri-populated Northern provinces of Iran. It made attempt to back Armenia trying to 
mediate in the 1992 year Karabakh conflict. Iran, together with Russia makes attempts to 
impede exploitation of the Caspian oil fields by the western oil companies claiming that the 
Caspian Sea is a secluded reservoir.  
 Turkey’s attitude towards such top issues as the Caspian Sea oil transportation, the East 
West transport corridor and the Karabakh conflict is quite different. Apart from Iran, 
Turkey has more developed economy and looks, therefore, more competitive.  As a NATO 
member it enjoys steady positions in the region, carrying danger to Russian and Iran’s 
interests in Central Asia, but Turkey’s political and economic outlooks greatly depend on 
the Caucasus as far as the way to the Central Asia lays on the Caucasus. Turkey failed to 
revive its traditional idea of “The great Turan”, that was supposed to unite peoples of the 
Turkish origin of newly established independent countries after disintegration of the Soviet 
Union. 
On the face of it habitual orientations pertaining to the Caucasus are being gradually 
restored:   
Azerbaijan tries to formulate pragmatic relations with Russia, though generally it may be 
regarded as Turkey-orientated. Azerbaijan-Iran relations may be specified as lukewarm 
because of lack of confidence.  
Armenia is regarded as Russia’s ally in the South Caucasus. Armenia has nice relations 
with Iran, whereas relations with Turkey are somewhat tensed.   
Georgia has no precise orientation towards any of the regional country, trying to keep 
balance between them. The Russian-Georgian relations may be specified as unsteady, 
though developing, yet Georgia is very cautious with Turkey’s initiative. Georgia has no 
common border with Iran, so, Georgia considers Iran extremely through its policy towards 
Russia, Turkey and western countries.    
Being a part of the Russian Federation, the North Caucasus constantly struggles for 
independence gradually reducing Russian control from one hand and strengthening 
connections with Turkey, Iran and countries of Middle East from another. 
Thus, Russian control is being reduced in the Caucasus, whereas links with Turkey and 
Iran, forbidden in the Soviet period, are being gradually renewed, that imply restoration of 
traditional balance in the Caucasus between Russia, Turkey, and Iran.  
It is noteworthy to mention that decrease of Russian control in the Caucasus will not urge 
increase of Iran and Turkey's chances in the Caucasus.  
Iran didn’t succeed in its attempts to strengthen positions in Azerbaijan (correspondingly 
in the Caucasus), by erecting new mosques. Turkey’s efforts to sustain the president of 
Azerbaijan Elchibey and his pro-Turkish policy caused increase of Russia’s influence in 
Azerbaijan. This can be proved by painless replacement of Elchibey by relatively moderate 
politician Heidar Aliev. 
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Despite the Russian-Georgian relations worsened, Georgia's attitude towards Turkey 
remains cautious due to the repercussions of the past relations with Turkey from one hand 
and events of the last few years from another. Participation of Russians in the Abkhazian 
conflict was widely expected by the Georgians taking into account Russian-Georgian tensed 
relations, but participation of citizens of Turkey and the North Caucasians alongside the 
separatists caused the Georgians anxiety and aroused suspicions concerning the interests of 
Turkey. Subsequently, Georgia, calculating to avert further violation of the regional 
balance, reverted to Russia. 
Thus, the Caucasus remains the hot geopolitical unit due to its involved pattern of 
historically developed orientations. Consideration of the Caucasus through any of the big 
regional countries (Turkey, Iran, and Russia) may spark violation of balance in the region; 
i.e. attempts of any of the regional countries to dominate in the Caucasus may strengthen an 
opposition. (This circumstance makes Elchibey's concepts of "Turkism" an extraneous 
doctrine). In this connection the Baltic republics have got better conditions – the East-or-
West dilemma is certainly easier to solve. 
In the last years of the Soviet period the Soviet republics hoped to be sustained by the 
western communities in their struggle for independence. They regard the western countries 
as guarantors of progressing democratic processes in the Soviet republics. The Baltic 
republics had far better conditions than the Caucasian ones due to more clear-cut position of 
the West in the Baltic republics. 
Armed conflicts and shaky Russian-Georgian relations aroused Georgia’s fear to be 
repeatedly abandoned by the West. The former foreign minister of Germany Mr. Gensher, 
during his visit in Georgia in 1992, was asked if the western countries would support 
Georgia to resist confrontation with Russia. Mr. Gensher assured the Georgian community 
that the western countries would sustain Georgia in search of independence.  
In 1992 year Georgia found itself drawn not only into the deep economic crisis, but also 
into the military conflicts. Disintegration of the Soviet Union notwithstanding, Russia, 
unwilling to admit Georgia’s independence, supported separatists both in Abkhazia and 
Tskinvali regions. The Russian mass media intensely discussed Georgia’s political status 
(what would suit Russia more: Georgia united or split into Abkhazian, Osetian, and 
Armenian states.) By that time, breaking a precedent, western countries Germany, France, 
Great Britain, and USA first admitted Georgia’s independence that agitated Russia, 
including representatives of Russian democratic forces (Mrs. Staravoltova, Mrs. Bonner, 
etc). At last, Russia had to admit Georgia’s independence. 
Political, economic and humanitarian support of the West played a significant role in 
development of democratic processes in the South Caucasian countries. Hence, the 
Caucasian countries are open to further relations and co-operation with the West and try to 
reinforce connections with its countries. Apart from the past times nowadays the Caucasians 
regard the West as a major factor of stability in the Caucasus with a precise place in the 
system of forces of regional balance.  
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Geopolitical Survey 
As it was stated above, the Caucasus is a political region with certain arrangement of 
geopolitical forces where all political processes are developing according to some logic. 
Here we make attempts to analyze results of such development and possible danger to 
security of the Caucasus in case of "natural" development of events, i.e. without interfering 
and demonstration of a certain political will that would change the habitual march of events. 
It would be interesting to discuss relations between the Caucasian nations that have been 
struggling for survival in different political teams, not from the point of view of 
confrontation with Iran, Russia or Turkey.  
It is well known from the history that the North Caucasian nations, urged by Iran and 
Turkey used to invade Georgia (for inst. invasion of Eastern Georgia by Shamil in 1854). 
After Georgia had accepted protection of Russia, the Georgian militants of the Russian 
army used to revenge themselves on them and vice versa, the Russians often used the North 
Caucasians to suppress the Georgian rebels, as well as Armenians and Azeris. The 
Caucasian nations, facing similar problems, practically have been forced to fight against 
each other. 
The present situation echoes the past events. In 1992-93 years Chechens took an active 
part in the Abkhazian conflict struggling alongside Russians against Georgians. But after 
Georgians quit fighting and reverted to Russia in 1993-94 years, they began to formulate 
close relations with Russia driving it to attack “separatists”. When the Russian-Chechen 
Military conflict began in 1994-95 years the Russian aircrafts used the territory of Georgia 
bombing positions of the Chechen armed forces.  
(It is worth mentioning that in 1992-93 years Georgia’s policy was orientated at the 
executive branch of Russia (“democratic” Russia), whereas the North Caucasians searched 
for an ally in the parliament of Russia (“reactionary” Russia). Tensions between “two 
Russias” sparked disagreements between their allies in the Caucasus and vice versa: 
discords in the Caucasus mirror confrontations between above-mentioned opposing forces 
in Russia).   
Thus, the Georgians and the North Caucasians found themselves in different political 
teams again.  
The conclusion is as follows: Attempts of the Caucasians to protect their interests in the 
Caucasus by means of their big regional allies are absolutely pointless as far as they usually 
scale up confrontation making the situation uncontrollable that finally sparks strengthening 
of positions of the big regional powers and brings the Caucasus to the contrary result. (For 
instance, Armenia, allying with Russia and Iran, tries to strengthen its positions with Turkey 
but runs a risk using the same alliance against Azerbaijan or Georgia. The same can be 
mentioned concerning all Caucasian nations).  
Nevertheless, regulation of these problems is not unthinkable. Being insoluble, they may 
be at least manageable: if the entire region, political orientation and slogan notwithstanding, 
pursues the (inter-Caucasian) non-confrontation policy. Unless all conflicts are not 
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regulated by negotiations between the Caucasian countries, the Caucasian historical 
mechanism will work and harm everybody's interests.  
Seemingly, the regional countries Russia, Turkey and Iran can't be regarded as only 
guarantors of security and stability of the Caucasian countries. Interference in the internal 
affairs of the Caucasus would spark riots in the region. A dilemma-either co-operation or 
confrontation may also carry danger. Either negligence of the big regional powers' interests 
or their excessive interference in the Caucasus's internal affairs may bring the region 
towards the grave economic and political consequences. The following story is a good 
example to demonstrate possibility to keep up balance between two regional powers: 
Two nations of the similar geopolitical condition –– the Basks and the Catalonians 
located on the French and Spanish border have been sustained influence of both countries 
during the long centuries. The two countries succeeded in their attempts to split the land of 
the Basks. By that time just on the French and Spanish frontier appeared the Catalonian 
political unit - Andorra that remained independent up to the present times. The Basks, 
struggling both against the French and the Spain couldn't stand, whereas Andorra, admitting 
at its territory both Spanish episcopate and French counts and later accepted double 
suzerainty, survived. The two powers balanced in Andorra turned to be favorable for the 
country. If the Basks formulated the like policy towards France and Spain, they would enjoy 
independence like Andorra.  
This example shows that the Caucasian problems are at least manageable, if not soluble, 
in case all Caucasian nations come to terms reckoning with interests of all three great 
regional powers and trying to balance forces focused in the region. The Caucasians and 
particularly Georgia have to formulate policy towards the regional countries taking into 
account the common situation in the Caucasus. Caucasian unity is being an extremely 
pragmatic concept based on necessity to consolidate interests of all Caucasian nations in 
joint efforts to formulate right policy towards other countries. 
The given analysis shows that the policy of Georgia as well as other Caucasian countries 
including the North Caucasus is to be regarded as one whole as far as interests of three big 
regional countries (Russia, Turkey, and Iran) are realised in the Caucasus in a whole. The 
Caucasus is to be regarded as a Barry Buzan's "security complex", i.e. "group of states 
whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national 
securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another". 
There certainly appear some alternative approaches; for instance, some people in Georgia 
consider there is no need to formulate special policy towards such countries as Armenia and 
Azerbaijan – they should be treated as any of other independent countries, whereas 
Georgia’s policy towards the North Caucasus should not be discussed at all regarding it as a 
part of the Russian Federation. According to other categorical premise, the Georgians and 
the North Caucasians are regarded as a unique, historically determined unity.  
In this connection, it should be mentioned that the Caucasian unity is rather a pragmatic 
concept targeting at provision of the Caucasus with peace and stability. For instance, despite 
the North Caucasus is a part of the Russian Federation, it acts as an independent political 
force, which can directly affect Georgia’s stability (Participation of the North Caucasians in 
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the Abkhazian conflict). These circumstances make the Georgians seriously reckon with the 
North Caucasian factor while formulating the foreign policy. Straight dialogue with the 
North Caucasus is a matter of security rather than of Georgian and North Caucasian 
common ethnic and cultural outset.  
The military conflicts and their consequences followed the break up of the Soviet Union. 
The Caucasian countries, having experienced the same problems that they had in the past 
times came at a conclusion that the way to peace and sustainable development of the 
Caucasus is a dialogue and co-operation between each other. Enchained by acute problems 
of refugees, uncertain political status of seized territories, etc, the Caucasian nations 
comprehended importance of a peace dialogue and political methods of their solution. In 
this connection the Georgian Project of “Peaceful Caucasus” and “Caucasian OSCE”– the 
Chechen idea are noteworthy to mention. The joint economic projects, such as the East 
West transport corridor, the Caspian oil transportation project can play the significant part 
in development of the Caucasian co-operation.  
 Attitude of the big regional countries towards the Caucasian unity is a matter of special 
consideration. This unity must be beneficial for all above-mentioned countries, as far as 
they are interested in stability of the Caucasus. Anyway, the Caucasian unity must be 
formed with active participation of these countries reckoning with their consultations and 
public opinion. 
Formation of the foreign policy of the Caucasus (Georgia) towards the non-regional 
countries, particularly, with the west countries, is one of the most significant issues. 
Traditionally, the West considered the Caucasus through Russia, Turkey or Iran. The 
West countries used to support Iran and Turkey in order to halt the Russian expansion in the 
South. But this policy sparked exacerbation of the situation in the Caucasus and break up of 
the historically developed balance between Russia, Turkey, and Iran, as far as these 
countries had their own traditional interests in the Caucasus. Subsequently, Georgia, trying 
to wrest itself from Turkey and Iran’s control found itself incorporated by Russia. 
Nowadays, we observe quite another picture: straight links with the western countries 
enable the Caucasian countries to avert traditional competition between Russia, Turkey and 
Iran for hegemony in the region. The more the West affects the region, the steadier is the 
Caucasus. But if the West encourages predominance of any of these countries empowering 
it to regulate the processes in the region, (i.e. supports either Russia in order to regulate 
democratic processes in the Caucasus, or Turkey targeting at decrease of Russian control in 
the Caucasus), the balance will be upset sparking new conflicts. Thus, the Caucasian 
countries should be directly integrated into the World processes but not through or by 
means of any of the regional countries.  
Thus, the present situation of the Caucasus can be specified as transitional from the ‘old’ 
to ‘new’ concepts of the Caucasian security. The old concept of security implied 
protectorate of a big regional country (Russia, Turkey, Iran), whereas the new concept is 
based on the Caucasian alliance and strengthening of straight connections with the western 
countries. Obviously, the transition period is uneven and contradictory, mainly due to 
coexistence of both concepts that spark contradictory approaches towards the foreign policy 
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of the Caucasus. For instance, in some cases Georgia specifies the Abhkazian problem as 
analogous to the Chechen one (let us say, to make Russia concerned about regulation of the 
Abkhazian problem), whereas in other cases (for instance, discussing the same problems 
with the North Caucasians) it stresses the contrary opinion. As to the North Caucasians, the 
transitional period can be traced in their contradictory approach towards Georgia. First, 
finding likeness between the Abkhazian and their own problems, the Chechens supported 
the Abkhazian separatists in the struggle against Georgia, then they preferred to be 
orientated at Georgia. Asserting on the difference between the Abkhazian and the Chechnya 
conflicts Georgia could diminish the role of a mediator that Russia claims to take in the 
Abkhazian conflict.  Contradictions caused by coexistence of the old and the new 
approaches can be also traced in Armenia and Azerbaijan. For instance, Armenia tries to 
even up military strategic co-operation with Russia and economic support of the West.  
Evidently, analysing the present situation there still remains a danger of restoration of the 
old security system, but strengthening of the straight links with the West and development 
of the Caucasian dialogue gradually makes it less possible.  
Finally, after the World War II, when the World was divided into two poles, the western 
countries supported Iran and Turkey to rescue them from threatening Soviet aggression. 
Subsequently, the problems of democracy and human rights in those countries were ignored 
to some extent. Solution of these and other problems concerning reformation of those 
countries is a rather thoughtful issue that may seriously affect stability of those countries. 
For this reason, in the foreign policy these countries are traditionally balancing between 
Russia and the West seeking their own "unique" way of development corresponding to their 
traditional concepts. This can be exemplified by Iran's revolution as well as by 
strengthening of Islamic movement in Turkey.  
In such circumstances the Caucasus may play either negative (provoking separatism in 
these countries), or positive (serving for a buffer) roles. If the Caucasian countries find 
themselves drawn into the inner processes of these countries, consequences will be 
deteriorating. This circumstance makes even more significant development of straight links 
with the West.  
 
Conclusions 
The external field of Georgia could be divided into three parts: 
1. Local (sub-regional) - the Caucasus is a complex system of distribution of geopolitical 
forces, which has been developing under the influence of Russia, Turkey, and Iran, though 
it could remain different from these countries. Confrontation between three big geopolitical 
powers sparks confrontation within the Caucasus. Interference of any of the big regional 
powers in the inner Caucasian conflicts inevitably involves another regional power, i.e. 
expansion of the conflict.  
2. Regional (open regional) - Russia, Turkey, Iran - These countries demonstrate the 
special interest towards the Caucasus and have been making constant attempts to bring the 
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region under control. From the other hand, the Caucasus is not a sole region they are 
interested in. They play a significant part in the World politics.  
3. Global  (the World) – The non-regional powers traditionally are less interested in the 
Caucasus, but they are extremely concerned with the Situation in Russia, Turkey and Iran.   
These are interrelated statements greatly affecting each other, however, taking into 
account all above-listed circumstances, it is quite possible to work out a certain approach 
towards each level of political relations: 
1. As far as the regional countries tend to be involved in the Caucasian conflicts due to 
the above-discussed historical mechanism, Georgia has to formulate the foreign policy 
targeting at regulation of inner conflicts within the framework of the Caucasus. It is possible 
only through negotiations, targeting at establishment of a kind of the Caucasian regional 
unity and elaboration of ways of regulation of inner Caucasian problems by means of local 
forces, besides, it is important to plan joint programs in Economy, politics, social fields, and 
science.   
2. As to Russia-Turkey-Iran "open" region, Georgia should make maximal efforts to 
reckon with their interests trying not to breach the balance in favor of either of them in the 
Caucasus in order to avoid disruptions, which may bring the region to the conflicts.  
3. Non-regional countries (the West, in particular). Georgia should strengthen straight 
connections with the western countries avoiding integration into the World community 
through any of the habitual, big regional country, as far as this may cause strengthening of 
latest positions in the Caucasus, break up of the balance and consequently, instability.  
On the basis of above-stated approaches we can frame short statements with regards to 
the Georgian  (the Caucasian countries’) foreign policy.  
Local level – Integration; Regional level – Balance; Global level – Straight connections. 
These principles come together and cover the entire field of the foreign policy. Besides, 
the above-listed approaches shape an entire system of the Georgian political background; 
violation of either of them causes violation of the others. For instance, formation of 
relationships with the West through any of the big regional countries would cause 
strengthening of its positions in the Caucasus, breach of the balance between the big 
regional countries and subsequently, instability in the Caucasus.  
 
* *  * 
Analysis, presented in the article is superficial to a certain extent. For instance, the North 
Caucasus is regarded as one region, whereas it comprises several ethnic groups. The role of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan in interrelations of the North and the South is not analysed either. 
Still it can be used both for more detailed analysis of the present situation and spotting out 
the future tendencies.  
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- "Christian" 
The given pattern outlines the Caucasus as a complex political unit. Though 
simplified, it gives essential characteristics of the Caucasian geo-political picture. 
 
 
 
 
- "Muslim"   
(Southern) 
Geopolitical Fields  
- "Christian"   
(Northern) 
Coming into contact, the Northern and Southern geopolitical forces created
not a mere junction of the Islamic South and Christian North geopolitical
areas, but a kind of transversal zone consisted of the Christian South and
Muslim North.   
- Turkey  
- Iran  
Geopolitical Fields  
Armenia and Azerbaijan also played the same part of a point of intersection of
Iran and Turkey. Armenia is situated straight between Turkey and  Azerbaijan,
ethnically related toTurkey. The small isthmus, which joins Armenia to Iran,
separates Azerbaijan from Turkey 
fig. 1 
fig. 2 
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8. Russia  
9. Adige  
10. Karachai-Cherkezia 
11. Kabardo-Balkaria  
12. Ossetia 
13. Ingusheti  
14. Chechenia  
15. Dagestan  
16. Kalmikia  
17. Turkey  
18. Iran  
4. Azerbaijan  
5. Naghchevan 
6. Kharabag 
1. Georgia  
2. Abkhazia
3. Adjara 
7. Armenia 
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